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Abstract 
In a standard search and matching framework, the labor market presents frictions while in the competitive product 
market the demand is infinitely elastic.To have a more realistic framework, some models abandon the assumption of 
infinite elasticity and consider a two-tier productive scheme in the goods market. In this paper, I establish the 
conditions that are sufficient for the existence and the uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium for this kind of models. 
I also notice that some standard assumptions about the production and matching technology (a Cobb-Douglas 
function) do not fulfill such conditions and so may hinder the existence of an equilibrium.
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     1 Introduction
In a standard search and matching model, the labor market presents frictions, whereas
in the perfectly competitive product market the demand is inﬁnitely elastic, so that an
increase in supply does not aﬀect the equilibrium price (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999,
and Pissarides 2000).
In order to introduce a more realistic framework for the goods market, some scholars
(e.g. Joseph, Pierrard, and Sneessens 2004, and Pierrard 2005, and Cahuc and Zylberberg
2004, p. 618-622) abandon the assumption of an inﬁnite elasticity of demand and consider
a two-tier productive scheme. Diﬀerent types of workers (usually, low-skilled and high-
skilled ones) are hired in intermediate good sectors. Such goods face a decreasing demand
from a ﬁnal representative ﬁrm that produces the unique consumption good1. Papers of
this kind make often use of numerical simulations and scant attention is paid to analytical
properties.
This paper takes a diﬀerent stand. I consider a simpliﬁed framework in which there are
only two intermediate sectors and I look for the conditions under which a (unique) steady-
state equilibrium exists. Uniqueness is guaranteed by the assumption of constant returns
to scale (henceforth, CRS) in the ﬁnal good function, whereas a suﬃcient condition for
the existence concerns the diﬀerence between the marginal productivity and the income
received when unemployed. If it is positive as the levels of labor market tightness in both
sectors tend to zero, then an equilibrium exists.
Since this condition is not fulﬁlled by imposing a Cobb-Douglas technology both in
the matching and in the production function, introducing such a functional form may
hinder the existence of an equilibrium.
2 The Model
2.1 Production Technology
Assume an economy with one ﬁnal good (the numeraire), two intermediate goods sectors
and two types m and n of inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral workers. The goods markets
are perfectly competitive. Each producer of an intermediate good hires only one type of
worker. Moreover, every m-skilled (respectively, n-skilled) employee produces one unit of
the intermediate good m (resp. n). So Ei (i ∈ {m,n}) denotes both the amount of the
i intermediate good produced and the number of employees in the i-th sector. The ﬁnal
good production function exhibits CRS and is written as:






2 < 0, i ∈ {m,n}. (1)
The two inputs are p-substitutes ( ∂2F
∂Em∂En > 0).2 Let pi denote the real price of the
intermediate good i. Cost minimization in the ﬁnal sector leads to pi = ∂F(Em,En)/∂Ei,
with i ∈ {m,n}. Further, the value of home production is denoted by bi > 0.
1Acemoglu (2001) has also constructed a similar model, but with one decisive diﬀerence: workers are
identical ex ante and can be employed in high-paid or low-paid jobs.
2I also assume one Inada condition: lim
Ei→0
∂F
∂Ei = +∞. Imposing a condition as Ei → +∞ is useless,
since in this model the upper bounds of both inputs are given by the labor force that has a positive ﬁnite
value.
22.2 Search Technology
The model is developed in steady state. Time is continuous and r denotes the discount
factor. Each type of worker can be either unemployed or be employed in his sector. The
labor market is perfectly segmented, meaning that every i-type worker can be hired only
by ﬁrms in the i sector. The matching function is written respectively Mi = m(Ui,Vi),
with Ui being the number of unemployed people and Vi the number of job vacancies in sec-
tor i. It is assumed to be increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Labor market
tightness is deﬁned as θi ≡
Vi
Ui. The job ﬁlling rate is q(θi) ≡ Mi/Vi = m( 1
θi,1), q′(θi) < 0,
whereas the job ﬁnding rate is equal to α(θi) ≡ Mi/Ui = θiq(θi), with α′(θi) > 0.3 At an
exogenous rate φi a match is destroyed. In steady state, the stocks of individuals in each
position are constant. With an exogenous size of the labor force, Li, the employment
level is given by:
Ei = Ei(θi) ≡
α(θi)
φi + α(θi)
  Li, i ∈ {m,n}. (2)
Notice that E′
i(θi) > 0 and, from the condition in footnote 3, limθi→+∞ Ei(θi) = Li.
2.3 Vacancy Supply and Wage-Setting Curves
Once a worker ﬁnds a ﬁrm with a vacant job, a surplus of the match arises. The Nash
bargaining solution is assumed in order to split the surplus, whereas a zero proﬁt condition
is imposed on the demand side of the market.
The characterization of the model is standard. Hence, I directly present the equi-
librium equations (obtained by merging the so-called vacancy supply and wage-setting
curves) and refer to Pissarides (2000, chapter 1) for the primitive conditions under which
they are derived:













with i ∈ {m,n}, i  = j, ki is the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy in units of ﬁnal good,
and βi represents workers’ bargaining power. Function Gi = 0 is the equilibrium condi-
tion in labor market i and depends on θj only through the marginal productivity
∂F
∂Ei.
Diﬀerentiating Gi with respect to θi , I obtain:
dGi
dθi








< 0 and Bi ≡ (1 − βi)
∂2F
∂Ei
2   E
′
i(θi) < 0,
i ∈ {m,n}. I also diﬀerentiate Gi with respect to Ej:
dGi
dθj





j(θj) > 0 with i,j ∈ {m,n}, i  = j. (5)
3Moreover, I impose that limθi→0 q(θi) = +∞ and limθi→+∞ α(θi) = +∞.
33 Equilibrium
3.1 Conditional Equilibrium in each market
The ﬁrst existence result consists in showing under which assumptions there exists a θi
such that Gi(θi,θj) = 0 holds, conditional on θj.
Note that
dGi
dθi < 0 and limθi→+∞ Gi(θi,θj) → −∞ for the conditions imposed in
footnote 3 and the limit behavior of equation (2). This result holds for any value of
θj ∈ [0, +∞). If limθi→0 Gi(θi,θj) > 0 ∀θj ∈ [0, +∞), I could use the intermediate value
theorem to prove the existence of a conditional equilibrium. However, I can compute
such a limit only for values of θj that are not close to zero4. In fact, as both θi and θj
(and consequently Ei and Ej) tend to 0, the input of the marginal productivity takes an
indeterminate form5 0
0 and it is not possible to ascertain the sign of this expression6.
To rule out this possibility, two alternative assumptions are needed. Lemma 1 sum-
marizes the results.
Lemma 1 There always exists a θi ∈ (0,+∞) that solves Gi(θi, θj) = 0 ∀θj ∈ [0,+∞),
i,j ∈ {n,m}, i  = j if, alternatively,:
1. limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = 0 and
∂F
∂Ei (Ei,Ej) > bi ∀θi and θj ∈ [0,+∞) (except for
θi = θj = 0) with i,j ∈ {m,n}, i  = j .
2. limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = ǫi > 0, and ∂F
∂Ei (Ei = ǫi,Ej = ǫj) > bi with i,j ∈ {m,n},
i  = j. .
Proof.
CASE 1
Since limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = 0, i ∈ {m,n}, the sets θi ∈ [0,+∞) and Ei ∈ [0,Li] are
respectively the domain and the range of the function Ei(θi).
Consider the term inside the square brackets in (3) as θj = 0; it is positive, decreasing in
θi ∈ (0, +∞), and tends to ∂F
∂Ei (Li,Ej = 0) − bi > 0 as θi → +∞. The second term in
(3) is a ray starting from the origin and that tends to +∞ as θi → +∞.
So, there exists a θi ∈ [0,+∞) such that Gi(θi,θj = 0) = 0. The same reasoning can be
applied for any θj > 0.
CASE 2
Since limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = ǫi > 0, the domain and range of the function Ei(θi) become
respectively θi ∈ [0,+∞) and Ei ∈ [ǫi,Li], i ∈ {m,n}. Imposing ∂F
∂Ei (Ei = ǫi,Ej = ǫj) >
bi implies that limθi→0 Gi(θi,θj) > 0 ∀θj ≥ 0.
I can apply the intermediate value theorem and conclude that there exists a θi ∈ [0,+∞)
such that Gi = 0 ∀θj ∈ [0,+∞).
4In this case, it tends to inﬁnity for the Inada condition in footnote (2) and if limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = 0.
5Recall that the ﬁrst derivatives of CRS functions can be expressed in terms of the ratio of the two
inputs.
6On the contrary, there are no diﬃculties as θj → +∞. This is because limθj→+∞ Ej = Lj and ∂F
∂Ei
takes a positive ﬁnite value as Ej = Lj. So there exists a θi > 0 that solves Gi(θi,θj → +∞) = 0.
4Some Examples
CASE 1: CES production function with s > 1.















(Ei,Ej = 0) = 1 i,j ∈ {n,m}, i  = j.
For Lemma 1 (CASE 1), imposing bi < 1 is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a condi-
tional equilibrium.
CASE 2: CES matching function with s > 1.































> bi, i,j ∈ {n,m}, i  =
j, is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a conditional equilibrium.
Cobb-Douglas technology.
A Cobb-Douglas production function Y = aEγ
nE1−γ
m does not belong to CASE 1. In fact,
∂F
∂Ei = γY/Ei = 0 as Ej = 0, i,j ∈ {n,m}, i  = j.




i , α(θi) = aθ
γ
i , and
limθi→0 Ei = Ei(θi) = 0, so conditions of CASE 2 are not fulﬁlled.
Imposing a Cobb-Douglas formulation both in the the production and in the matching
technology implies that the conditional equilibrium in market i may not be satisﬁed for
values of θj close to 0. As we will see in the next paragraph, this may cause the absence
of the general equilibrium.
3.2 General Equilibrium









> 0 with i ∈ {m,n}, i  = j. (6)
Gi = 0 deﬁnes a monotonously increasing relationship in (θi,θj) space. At the general
equilibrium, the values of labor market tightness solve the following system:
 
Gn(θn,θm) = 0
Gm(θm,θn) = 0 (7)
Proposition 1 presents the results.
Proposition 1 If the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisﬁed, a steady state equilibrium
exists and is unique.
Proof.
I denote θm = gm(θn) the explicit function of Gm(θm,θn) = 0, and θm = gn(θn) the
explicit function of Gn(θn,θm) = 0. Both functions are monotonically increasing. Let
also θn = g−1
m (θm) and θn = g−1
n (θm) denote their inverse functions.
5EXISTENCE
For the conditions imposed in Lemma 1, there always exists a θm ∈ (0,+∞) that solves
Gm(θm,θn = 0) = 0. This is tantamount to writing that θm = gm(θn) has a positive
intercept in the vertical axis, that I denote with χm. Similarly, there always exists a
θn ∈ (0,+∞) that solves Gn(θm = 0,θn) = 0, implying that θm = gn(θn) has a positive
intercept in the horizontal axis, that I denote with χn.
Moreover, as noticed in footnote 6, there exists a θm ∈ (0,+∞) that solves Gm(θm,θn →
+∞) = 0. So, limθn→+∞ gm(θn) = Ψm ∈ ℜ+. Since there also exists a θn ∈ (0,+∞)
that solves Gn(θm → +∞,θn) = 0, one gets that limθm→+∞ g−1
n (θm) = Ψn ∈ ℜ+.
The domain and the range of θm = gm(θn) are respectively [0,+∞) and [χm, Ψm]. The
domain and the range of θm = gn(θn) are respectively [χn, Ψn] and [0,+∞). Since both
functions are monotonously increasing, they must intersect at least once (see Figure 1).
UNIQUENESS
I deﬁne H(θn) ≡ gm(θn) − gn(θn). If H(θn) is a monotonic function in the neighborhood
of the equilibrium steady-state, the equilibrium is unique.
Let θ∗
m and θ∗






















































I multiply the numerator of (9) by the denominator of (10) and the numerator of (10)
with the denominator of (9). I get four positive terms on the LHS and only one positive
term on the RHS. For (8) to hold, the four positive terms on the LHS must be greater
















































Expressions (11) and (12) are equal because of the Euler’s formula for functions with










. Then, inequality (8) is veriﬁed.
The equilibrium is unique.
4 Final Remarks
A Cobb-Douglas technology both in the matching and in the production function may
hinder the existence of a steady-state equilibrium. The reason is that the functions
6θm = gm(θn) and θm = g−1
n (θn) may not exist for values of respectively θn and θm close
to 0, point 1 of the existence proof cannot be established, and the two curves may not
cross each other. Figure 2 illustrates this case.
This is not a rare possibility. Consider a standard parametrization such as the one
performed by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, page 623) for this kind of models. The unit
of time corresponds to one year, r = 0.05, βi = 0.5, φi = 0.15, hi = 0.1 ∀i. The
matching function is Cobb-Douglas with a parameter γi = 0.5 ∀i. Contrarily to Cahuc
and Zylberberg (that consider a CES production function with elasticity of substitution
equal to 1.5), I impose a Cobb-Douglas formulation even in the production technology.
An is an eﬃciency parameter for workers in market n and it is equal to 1.5. For values
of bm ≥ 0.9 and bn ≥ 0.95, no equilibrium exists7.
Keeping the Cobb-Douglas formulation and imposing either bi = ρiwi with 0 < ρi < 1
or bi = 0 i ∈ {n,m} would not prevent from the absence of an equilibrium. The reason
is that, even under these hypotheses, the solution of the equation G(θi,θj = 0) = 0 is
indeﬁnite the existence proof cannot be made8.
The results of Proposition 1 should be seen as a warning about the use of a standard
Cobb-Douglas technology in models of this kind.
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